UFC 4-010-01
8 October 2003
Including change 1, 22 January 2007
APPENDIX C
RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL ANTITERRORISM MEASURES FOR NEW AND
EXISTING BUILDINGS
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SITE PLANNING. The following additional measures, if implemented, will
significantly enhance site security with little increase in cost and should be considered
for all new and existing inhabited buildings.
Recommendation 1. Vehicle Access Points. The first line of defense in
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limiting opportunities for aggressors to get vehicles close to DoD buildings is at vehicle
access points at the controlled perimeter, in parking areas, and at drive-up/drop-off
points. Keep the number of access points to the minimum necessary for operational or
life safety purposes. This will limit the number of points at which access may have to be
controlled with barriers and/or personnel at increased Force Protection Conditions or if
the threat increases in the future.
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Recommendation 2. High-Speed Vehicle Approaches. The energy of
a moving vehicle increases with the square of its velocity; therefore, minimizing a
vehicle's speed allows vehicle barriers to be lighter and less expensive should vehicle
barriers ever become necessary. To facilitate reductions in vehicle speeds in the future,
ensure there are no unobstructed vehicle approaches perpendicular to inhabited
buildings at the required parking and roadway standoff distances.
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Recommendation 3. Vantage Points. Vantage points are natural or
man-made positions from which potential aggressors can observe and target people or
other assets in and around buildings. Identify vantage points outside the control of
personnel in targeted buildings and either eliminate them or provide means to avoid
exposure to them. Means to avoid exposure may include actions such as reorienting
buildings or shielding people or assets in and around them using such measures as
reflective glazing, walls, privacy fencing, or vegetation.
Recommendation 4. Drive-Up/Drop Off Areas. Locate these areas
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away from large glazed areas of buildings to minimize the potential for hazardous flying
glass fragments in the event of an explosion. For example, locate the lane at outside
corners of buildings or otherwise away from main entrances. Coordinate the drive-
up/drop-off points with building geometries to minimize the possibility that explosive
blast forces could be increased due to being trapped or otherwise concentrated. For
further discussion of this issue, refer to the DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design
Manual.
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Recommendation 5. Building Location. Activities with large visitor
populations provide opportunities for potential aggressors to get near buildings with
minimal controls, and therefore, limit opportunities for early detection. To limit those
opportunities, maximize separation distance between inhabited buildings and areas with
large visitor populations.
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