UFC 4-021-02NF
27 September 2006
change 1, 23 October 2006
CHAPTER 2
ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEM OVERVIEW
2-1
OVERVIEW
2-1.1
ESS is the integrated electronic system that encompasses the ACS, interior
and exterior IDS, CCTV systems for assessment of alarm conditions, the DTM, alarm
reporting systems for monitor, control, and display, and the policies, procedures, and
response times that ensure that all elements of the ESS work effectively. It is part of an
overall physical protection system. As shown in Figure 2-1, the overall physical
protection system consists of civil engineering features of fences, gates, entry points,
clear zones, and standoff distances; architectural issues of construction materials,
barriers, doors, windows, and door hardware; structural issues of blast resistant
protection; mechanical issues of HVAC protection, electrical engineering issues of
power redundancy and lighting systems, ESS, and operational considerations such as
policy, procedures, and response times . In summary, the ESS is one component of a
bigger physical protection scheme. This chapter describes the ESS in general as a
lead-in to subsequent detailed chapters on each of the ESS subsystems.
Service Exception, Marine Corps: Aboard Marine Corps Installations, Mass
Notification Systems (MNS) are considered a component of the ESS. Design of Mass
Notification Systems is not within the scope of this UFC, refer to UFC 4-020-01 for Mass
Notification System design guidance.
2-2
DETECT, DELAY, AND RESPOND
2-2.1
For effective intrusion intervention, the ESS should operate on the Detect,
Delay, and Respond principle that ensures the time between detection of an intrusion
and response by security forces is less than the time it takes for damage or compromise
of assets to occur. Refer to Figure 2-2. (Note: Some documents consider the additional
specific steps of Annunciate, Classify, and Assess as part of the intrusion intervention
process. These additional steps are part of the process, but for this document are
intrinsically included as part of the Detect step.)
2-2.2
Table 2-1 provides an example of the times related to each detect and delay
option in Figure 2-2. The cumulative delay times shown in this example, illustrated by a
timeline in Figure 2-3 are estimated at slightly over eight and a half minutes. Assuming
a security forces response time of eleven minutes, the sequence of events shown in
Table 2-1 allows sufficient time for an adversary to compromise and/or damage the
targeted asset. Depending on the nature of the asset, there are some dictated
response times. Security and planning personnel should refer to DoD, agency, and
service directives to identify response requirements.
2-2.3
Conversely, assuming a security forces response time of five minutes, the
sequence of events shown in Table 2-1 allows sufficient time to intervene on the
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